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I.

INTRODUCTION

Interstate compacts govern more than ninety-five percent of the available
freshwater in the United States.' The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction
over sister-state suits regarding the enforcement and interpretation of these
agreements.! In the past, the Court has used principles of both contract law'
and statutory interpretation' to resolve compact disputes. In Kansas v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court ordered the State of Nebraska to pay partial disgorgement damages for breaching its compact with the State of Kansas in one
such dispute, but declined to grant an injunction against future violations.' The
Court also held that the states had to revise an ancillary technical agreement
specifying how water usage is calculated under the compact to ensure accuracy.
While each of these holdings is supported by precedent and public policy, the
way the Court reached its decision on the technical agreement and denial of the
injunction is problematic. In reforming the technical agreement, the Court articulated a rule that could apply to future cases and clarified previously confusing precedents. To set damages and deny the injunction, however, the Court
1.

Noah D. Hall, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts and Climate Change Adaptation, 5

ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'YJ. 237, 239-40 (2010). See generallyJosephW. Giradot, Note,
Towarda Jationa/Schemeofiterstate Water CompactAdjudication,23 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM

151, 151 & n.5 (1989). Rarely, Congress or the Court has allocated water use for the states by
statute or equitable apportionment, respectively. Id.
2. See L. Elizabeth Sarine, Note, The Supreme Court's ProblematicDekrence to Special
Masters in Interstate Water Disputes, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 535, 545 (2012).

3. See, e.g., Texas v. New Mexico (Texas IH, 482 U.S. 124, 131 (1987).
4. See, e.g., Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 351-52 (2010).
5. 135 S. CL 1042, 1057, 1059 (2015).
6.

Id.atI1062n.10.
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relied on broad equitable powers and a misapplication of contract law, rather
than establishing a consistent water-compact jurisprudence. The decision provides little guidance for states in future compact disputes which makes it harder
for them to efficiently negotiate solutions, which in turn makes it more likely
that they will occupy the Court with costly litigation.
II. DESCRION OF THE CASE AND OPINIONS
The Republican River and its tributaries drain a 24,900-square-mile basin
("the Basin") across Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska.! In 1943, those states,
with Congress's approval, negotiated and adopted the Republican River Compact ("the Compact"),' which allocates the "virgin water supply" of the Basin as
it would be if "undepleted by the activities of man" and specifies how much
water each state can take from the river system.' The Compact worked well
until the 1980s when the states clashed over whether water extracted from the
Basin by Nebraska's numerous groundwater wells, which decreased river flow
downstream to Kansas, counted toward Nebraska's allotment.o In 2000 the
Court ruled that this groundwater extraction did count toward Nebraska's allotment, and a series of negotiations produced the 2002 "Final Settlement Stipulation" ("the Settlement"), which involved adopting a computer model for calculating each state's water use ("the Accounting Procedure")." The Settlement
also clarified that in-Basin use of water imported from outside the Basin would
not count toward a state's consumption."
New problems emerged when Nebraska "substantially exceeded" its water
allocation in 2005 and 2006." Arbitration failed to resolve the dispute," and
Kansas petitioned the Court to enjoin further violations and award it "the
greater of Nebraska's gain or Kansas's loss" in damages.1 Nebraska counterclaimed that the Accounting Procedure erroneously included some imported
water during dry years." The dispute gave rise to the case of Kansas v. Nebraska
and the Court referred the matter to a Special Master ("the Master").
The Master found that Nebraska had taken inadequate steps to limit its
water use and thereby "knowingly exposed Kansas to a substantial risk" of

7. The river begins in Colorado, passes through northwestern Kansas into Nebraska, flows
through southern Nebraska, and finally cuts back into northern Kansas. Id. at 1049.
8. Id. Congressional approval of water compacts is widely seen as necessary under Article
I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution. See Giradot, supranote 1, at 151 n.5.
9. Act of May 26, 1943 (Republican River Compact), ch. 104, 57 Stat. 86 arts. II, III.
10. See Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1050; Aaron M. Popelka, The Repubhcan River Dispute:An
Analysis of the Parties'CompactIntepretation
and FinalSetlement Stipulation, 93 NEB. L. REV.

596, 601-02 (2004).
11.
12.

13.
14.
15.
Orig.)
dispute
16.
17.

See Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1050.

Id
See id.
Idatl050-51.
Report of the Special Master at 9, Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042 (2015) (No. 126,
Kansas also sued Colorado, which played a "minor part" in the case, but the primary
was between Kansas and Nebraska. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1051 n.3.
See Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1050-51.
Id. at 1051.
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breach." He estimated that Kansas's economic loss was $3,700,000," but he
added that because of local farming conditions Nebraska's gain was likely larger
than that by "more than several multiples."' He did not, however, recommend
granting Kansas all of the remedies it sought. Although he concluded that disgorgement was appropriate to promote future compliance and offset noneconomic harms,' the Master recommended only $1,800,000 of disgorgement and
no injunction because Nebraska had improved its behavior and was on track
for future compliance." The Master also found that the Accounting Procedure
had unfairly included some imported water in Nebraska's allocation, contrary
to the Compact's intent." Thus, he recommended that the Court adopt Nebraska's proposed changes to the algorithm to fix the oversight." Both states
filed exceptions to the report. Nebraska objected to the finding of "knowing"
breach and to the disgorgement award, citing Section 39 ("Section 39") of the
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment ("the Restatement"),
which allows disgorgement only for a "deliberate"-but not a "knowing"breach." Kansas wanted a larger disgorgement and opposed reforming the Accounting Procedure.
The Court adopted the Master's recommendations and overruled all exceptions." Writing for the Court, Justice Kagan" first noted that the Court's
authority in cases between states is "basically equitable in nature."" She next
asserted that the Court was empowered to use flexible equitable remedies to
ensure compliance with water compacts for two reasons." First, because states
make compacts as a substitute for enforceable equitable apportionment by the
Court, they presumably do so with the assumption that the Court is empowered
to hold the parties to their agreement." Second, because compacts are federal
laws approved by Congress they trigger the Court's "full authority to . . . promote compliance with ... public law.""
Accepting the Master's factual findings," the Court held the breach warranted disgorgement. Reasoning that some areas of law treat knowingly reckless

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See Report of the Special Master, supra note 15, at 111-12.
Id. at 170-71.
Id. at 178.
See id. at 132.
See id. at 112-16, 179, 183.
Id. at 15.
See id. at 23-25, 32-37, 43-57.

25.

Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1056 (2015) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (AM. LAw INST. 2011)).
26. Id. at 1051.
27. Id.
28. Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined the majority opinion. Id. at
1047.
29. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1051 (2015) (citing Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. 641, 648 (1973)).
30. Id. at 1052.
31. Id. (citing Texas v. New Mexico (Texas 11, 462 U.S. 554, 567 (1983)).
32. Id. at 1053 (citing Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981)).
33. See, e.g., id. at 1053-55.
RESTITUTION AND
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conduct as deliberate" and that the Restatement only meant to preclude disgorgernent in cases of "inadvertence, negligence, or unsuccessful attempts at
performance,"" the Court held that Nebraska's conduct satisfied Section 39."
Disgorgement would also provide a disincentive against future breaches, the
Court concluded, given that the "higher value of water on Nebraska's farmland
than on Kansas's ... is nearly a recipe for breach."" Noting that the aforementioned flexible equity principles allow awarding partial disgorgement, the Court
agreed that Nebraska's credible commitment to future compliance justified the
Master's small award." Justice Kagan denied the injunction on similar grounds,
citing the lack of a requisite "cognizable danger of recurrent violation" and noting that the threat of future disgorgement awards "will adequately guard" against
a relapse.
The Court also accepted the Master's suggestion to reform the Accounting
Procedure to comport with the states' intention when they signed the Compact
and Settlement, relying on two precedents where the Court had modified "subsidiary technical agreements" to water compacts." The unfairness of the oversight primarily bothered justice Kagan, who remarked that the large mistake
cost Nebraska more than one million dollars and argued that an undetected
error in Kansas's favor could not have been a quid traded for some dickered
quo in Nebraska's favor." She also worried that the unreformed Accounting
Procedure violated the Compact-and thus federal law-by effectively reducing
the amount of the virgin water supply that Nebraska could use."
Justice Thomas's partial concurrence criticized the majority for deviating
from established principles of equity to administer "abstract justice."" He argued that, to preserve state sovereignty, courts should interpret state compacts
more narrowly than private contracts and should use equitable remedies "only
rarely" in interstate disputes." Therefore, he believed that the majority's precedents equating recklessness with deliberateness in certain distinguishable contexts did not justify a nonliteral reading of Section 39 against Nebraska.' He
also criticized the $1,800,000 figure as a misapplication of disgorgement, characterizing it as an arbitrary number that " just feels like not too much, but not

34. Id. at 1056 (citing Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (2013) (holding that the bankruptcy code's exclusion for defalcation includes a requirement of intentionality
and that intentionality is satisfied by gross recklessness)).
35.

Id. at 1057 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJusT ENRICHMENT

§ 39 cmt.

f (AM. LAw INST. 2011)).
36. See id. at 1056-57 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT S 39 cmt. f (AM. LAw INST. 2011)).

37. Id. at 1057.
38. See id. at 1058-59.
39. Id. at 1059.
40. See id. at 1061-62 (citing Texas v. New Mexico ( Texas l), 446 U.S. 540 (1980) and Kansas v. Colorado (Kansas 14, 543 U.S. 86 (2004)).
41. Id. at 1060-61.
42. See id. at 1062-63.
43.
44.

Id. at 1065 (Thomas,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1065, 1067 (citing Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 351-53 (2010)).

45. See id at 1068-69.
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too little."' Finally, Justice Thomas opposed changing the Accounting Procedure because contract law only permits reformation in cases where the document does not accurately reflect what the parties actually agreed to-not to a case
where the parties agreed to something but were surprised by its consequences.4
The extent to which the error diminished Nebraska's allocation should be
chalked up to the inherently approximate nature of mathematical modeling and
so did not undermine the Compact.'
ChiefJustice Roberts joined the majority on the partial disgorgement award
and the denial of the injunction, but he agreed with Justice Thomas that the
Court could not reform the Accounting Procedure."
justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas's partial concurrence but also wrote a
brief opinion to criticize the Court's use of restatements."o Because restatement
authors have "abandoned" their original mission of presenting "an orderly statement of the general common law" in favor of stating "what the law ought to be,"
he said that their works should be viewed with suspicion and are no more authoritative than any other secondary source.

m.

CRTTIQUE

Each of the three remedy holdings in Kansas-technical reformation, partial
disgorgement, and denial of the injunction-can be supported by the Court's
precedent and may be sound public policy. Justice Thomas correctly stated
that the majority deviated from established contract law, but that departure is
not necessarily a bad thing. The Supreme Court should be empowered to advance the common law of original jurisdiction cases by fashioning new legal
doctrines." This is especially true in the area of water compact disputes, which
are a relatively new kind of case." Rather, the real problem arises when the
Court neither adheres to an existing principle nor fashions a new one. Opinions
rooted only in vague equitable powers are analytically suspect in terms of their
legitimacy" and are of little help in resolving future disputes in terms of their
utility.

46.
47.
48.

See id. at 1070-71.
See id. at 1071-72.
See id. at 1074.

49.
50.

Id. at 1064 (Roberts, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

51.

Id.

52. CA Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (declaring that to
merit a preliminary injunction harm must be "likely" and not merely "possible"); Savage v. Boies,
272 P.2d 349, 350-51 (Ariz. 1954) (allowing intentional infliction of emotional distress claims
without physical injury in Arizona); Gassner v. Lockett, 101 So. 2d 33, 33-34 (Fla. 1958) (granting
disgorgement remedy for breach of a real estate contract for first time in Florida); Attorney Gen.
v. Blake, 120001 UKHL 45, 120011 1 AC 268 (appeal taken from Eng.) (allowing disgorgement
damages for breach of contract for the first time in England).
53. The Court's first water compact case was Texas v. New Mexico (Texas 1, 446 U.S. 540
(1980). See Sarine, supranote 2, at 544.

54. Kevin C. Kennedy, EquitableRemedies andIrincipledDiscretion: The Michgan Experience, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. Rrv. 609, 609-10 (1997) ("A decision that rests solely on 'equity'
is an analytically naked, and analytically suspect, decision.").
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TECHNICAL REFORMATION

On the question of technical reformation, Justice Kagan applied a new principle of equity, plausibly supported by Court precedent, that provides transparent guidance to future water compact disputants. This is an improvement to
the Court's inconsistent jurisprudence about the extent to which compacts
should be read literally. In contrast, the Court's refusal to recognize water compacts as unique legal instruments forced it to shoehorn flexible remedies into
the rigid mold of established contract law. This produced a confusing and inconsistent ruling that makes it hard to predict what the Court will do in similar
future cases. As populations grow and changing weather patterns interfere with
water resources, conflicts like the one in Kansas will only become more common. The Court should facilitate negotiated settlements by giving clear, predictable guidance to states about what will happen should they litigate."
To change the Accounting Procedure, the Court for the first time articulated a rule that its "authority to devise 'fair and equitable solutions' to interstate
water disputes encompasses modifying a technical agreement to correct material
errors in the way it operates and thus align it with the compacting States' intended apportionment."" This doctrine diverges from general contract law, but
the Court's precedent supports it, and it may be a good rule for water compact
cases. Most significantly, though, the doctrine is an important step toward resolving conflicting Court precedent about how narrowly or broadly to interpret
compacts.
At common law, as Justice Thomas noted, the general rule is that once a
deal is made "equity cannot make a new contract for the parties," even if the
outcome may differ from what the parties expected." In entering a contract the
parties allocate the risk of such surprise; that the parties had mistaken expectations about how that risk would work out does not change the deal that they
made." Two Supreme Court precedents cited by Justice Kagan in Kansas, however, suggest that this rule might not apply to water compact cases. In Texas I,`
Texas and New Mexico had allocated a river's waters according to the "1947
condition," expressly defined to mean. the condition as described in a contemporary engineering report." When the states later discovered that the report

55. See generally Hall, supranote 1.
56. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1062 (2015) (internal citations omitted).
57. Edwin H. Abbot,Jr., Mistakc ofactasa GroundbrAinmativeEquitable ?ehel, HARV.
L. REv. 608, 610 (1910); accordKennedy, supranote 54, at 645-46; see adso, e.g, Lenawee Cnty.
Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 331 N.W.2d 203, 208, 211 (Mich. 1982) (enforcing "as is" clause in
land sale even though defects unknown to either party made the property essentially worthless);
Wood v. Boynton, 25 N.W. 42, 42-43, 45 (Wis. 1885) (upholding a sale of a gemstone that
turned out to be much more valuable than parties expected). But see Sherwood v. Walker, 33
N.W. 919, 923-24 (Mich. 1887) (demonstrating that courts sometimes allow such a surprise to
void a contract under the doctrine of mutual mistake).
58. See Kennedy, supia note 54, at 640-41; cf Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1074 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the parties understood their agreement to include some imprecision in
measurement).
59. Texas v. New Mexico (Texas l), 446 U.S. 540 (1980).
60. Texas v. New Mexico (Texas Il, 462 U.S. 554, 559 (1983) (describing the history of the
dispute and the Texas Iholding).
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was erroneous, however, the Court held that the provision should be reinterpreted to refer to the actual conditions in 1947." Similarly, in Kansas If' the
Court replaced a compact's one-year formula for calculating water consumption
with a more accurate ten-year one, holding that even if the change ran contrary
to the signatories' intended methodology, reformation would serve their
broader purpose: accuracy." Although Justice Thomas distinguished those
cases from Kansas,"JusticeKagan's rule is at least a plausible extension of them.
Kansas is an important step toward clarifying the Court's inconsistent precedents about how courts should read compacts. Although Texas land Kansas
Ilindicate that courts should interpret compacts more flexibly than private contracts, another line of cases suggests just the opposite. For example, the Court
held just a few years ago in Alabama v. North Carohina`that courts should read
compacts narrowly to preserve state sovereignty and, therefore, should not read
6
into them a duty to perform in good faith usually implied in private contracts.
The Court has also previously said that its equitable powers in interstate disputes do not extend to overriding explicit agreements holding, in New.Jersey v.
New York' and other cases, that it lacked authority to rewrite a boundary agreement between two states "no matter what the equities of the circumstances might
otherwise invite.""
These two lines of cases show that there are good arguments for both broad
and narrow readings of compacts. The important thing is that the Court should
take a consistent approach, either by choosing one standard or making clear
when it will read compacts literally and when it will reform them. In the past,
however, the Court has alternated confusingly between the two. A series of
cases between Texas and New Mexico illustrates this vacillation. As discussed
above, the Court in Texas Ireinterpreted the meaning of the phrase "1947 condition," despite explicit language to the contrary. In Texas II, however, the
Court took a much narrower approach and refused to appoint a third-party tiebreaker to a deadlocked river commission because it could not give relief inconsistent with a compact's "express terms."" Yet in the dispute's final chapter,
Texas III the Court appointed a river master to manage ongoing disputes, asserting without explanation that such an order was consistent with the same
compact even though it contained no provision allowing a river master."o Thus
if the reformation doctrine expressed in Kansas is consistently followed, it will
provide at least some clarity about how compacts will be read.
61. Id. at 559-63, 573-74.
62. Kansas v. Colorado (Kansas 1), 543 U.S. 86 (2004).
63. Id. at 99, 101-03; see also Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 244-46 (1991)
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (describing the majority's reinterpreting of an explicit compact term
to avoid what they perceived as an absurd result).
64. See Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. CL 1042, 1073 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
65. Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 351-52 (2010).
66. Id. at 352.
67. New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767 (1998).
68. Id. at 811; see idso, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 565 (1963), overuled on
othergrounds byCalifornia v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 674 (1978) ("[Clourts have no power
to substitute their own notions of an 'equitable apportionment' for the apportionment chosen by
Congress."); Washington v. Oregon, 211 U.S. 127, 135 (1908).
69. Texas v. New Mexico (Texas Il), 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983).
70. See Texas v. New Mexico (Texas III), 482 U.S. 124, 134-35 (1987).
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In addition to being reasonably supported by precedent, technical reformation is also a sensible rule. The long-term nature of water compacts" and
the inherent limits of human foresight ensure that compacts will sometimes
need to be modified, both in response to technological advancement and changing circumstances." For example, many early water compacts treat water as a
commodity and may be ill-suited to modern views of rivers as ecological and
cultural resources." Ideally, states should make necessary changes through negotiation, and sometimes they do. But when negotiations fail, as they did in
Kansas, states turn to the Supreme Court." Allowing the Court to arbitrate may
be the least bad option."
B.

PARTIAL DISGORGEMENT

In contrast to Justice Kagan's clear statement of the principle behind reformation, the Court's monetary award in Kansas is confusing because although
disgorgement may have been appropriate in principle, the amount actually
awarded was either a misapplication of it or some other kind of damages masquerading as disgorgement. Disgorgement seems appropriate for two reasons.
First, the majority's reading of Section 39 fits with the Restatement's focus on
the promisor's culpability. The commentary clarifies, for example, that only
the breach, not the resulting profit, need be deliberate." And, as Justice Kagan
noted, the commentary also indicates that only "inadvertence, negligence, or
unsuccessful attempts at performance," which are less within the promisor's
control, preclude disgorgement." In terms of blameworthiness, Nebraska's
knowing breach seems more analogous to a deliberate one than to an inadvertent one.
Second, while disgorgement is a rare remedy for contract breach," water
compacts might be an area where it is generally good public policy. In commercial contexts, contract scholars disagree over whether "efficient breach" is
desirable: society may be better off if A can sell goods promised to B at a higher
price elsewhere and compensate B for his actual loss." With water compacts,

71. Some are almost 100 years old. Popelka, supra note 10, at 597; RobertW. Adler, Revtisiting the Colorado River Compact: Time lbr a Change, 28 J. LAND REsOURCES & ENvrL. L. 19,
19, n.3 (2008).
72. See Sarine, supra note 2, at 545.
73. See Douglas L. Grant, Iteistate Water Allocation Compacts: When the Virtue of Permanence Becomes de Vice ofInflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REv. 105, 105-07 (2003).
74. Sarine, supra note 2, at 539.
75. CJonathanHorne, On Notlesolidng InterstatcDisputes, 6 N.Y.U.J.L. & LIBERTY 95,
97 (2011) (characterizing original jurisdiction sister-state suits as a substitute for civil war).
76. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. b
(Am. Law Inst. 2011) ("[T]here is no requirement ... that the claimant prove the motivation of

the breaching party."); id. at cmt. f (requiring that the "breach be deliberate" (emphasis added)).
See Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1056-57 (2015) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
§ 39 cmt. f (AM. LAw INST. 2011)).
78. See Eyal Zamir, ContractLawand Theory: Three Views ofthe Cathedral 81 U. CHI. L.
REv. 2077, 2110-11 (2014).
79. See, e.g., Peter Linzer, On dhe Amorality of C'onactRemedies-Eiciency,Equi and
the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 111, 114-16 (1981). Sce generalyRESTATEMENT
77.

oF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

(TIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§ 39

cmt. h (2011).
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however, public policy favors performance over compensation for the two reasons Justice Kagan identified: to preserve states' sovereignty over their natural
resources and to effectuate statutes passed by Congress. Yet as she noted, a
situation where water is worth more in an upstream state than in a downstream
one is practically a "recipe for breach."" Disgorgement solves this problem by
making it no longer profitable for the upstream state to take more than its fair
share." The Court embraced similar logic in Porter v. WarnerHoldng Co.
when it required a landlord to disgorge its profits from violating a rent control
statute in order to remove its incentive to break the law." The Court has also
previously recognized that disgorgement uniquely protects a promisee's noneconomic interests." Nebraska's breach imposed large noneconomic costs on
Kansas, including the undermining of its autonomy and the forgone ecological
and cultural benefits of having the river, even though those factors may have
been included in the initial bargain." These costs are hard to value directly, and
expectation damages based on the price of water would undercompensate a
downstream state for such losses." By promoting compliance over compensation, disgorgement avoids the problem of valuation.
The problem with the Court's award in Kansas, however, is that it was disgorgement in name only. The majority said that it affirmed the amount because
the Master properly weighed Nebraska's incentives, along with past and present
behavior, to reach an appropriate amount," but that is not what the Master actually did. His analysis made no weighing of Nebraska's incentives: nowhere
does he state why, or even that, this amount will promote future compliance.
Moreover, the Master considered improper factors, writing that his award turns
Kansas's damages "net of reasonable transaction costs, into an amount that approximates a full recovery for the harm suffered."" Thus rather than properly
focusing on the promisor's incentives, the Master calculated "disgorgement"
based on the promisee's loss." Finally, other than mentioning these factors, the

80. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1057.
81. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39(2) (AM.
LAw INsT. 2011); Caprice L. Roberts, RestitutionaryDisgorgeinentibrOpportunisticBreach of
Contractand Mikadon ofDanages, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 131, 139 (2008) (quoting Judge Posner that disgorgement aims to remove the profitability from breach). But see Marco Jimenez,
Remedial Consdience, 62 EMORY L.J. 1309, 1314 (2013) (arguing that the primary purpose of
disgorgement is to punish, and that contract stability is an incidental benefit).
82. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 400 (1946).
83. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 514-16 (1980).
84. CEH. David Gold, Supreme CourtStruggles with DamageAssessnentin WaterDispute
as Interstate Compact Breaks Dowsn, 29 EcOLOGY L.Q. 427, 429-30 (2002) (arguing the Court's
decision in Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001) shows the compact's inability to "meet its
stated objectives" and to account for the noneconomic aspects of water and state sovereignty).
85. See Linzer, supra note 79, at 116-17; see also Gold, supranote 84, at 429-30.
86. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. CL 1042, 1059 (2015).
87. See Report of the Special Master, supra note 15, at 179 (saying only that the award "represents a disgorgement of the amount by which Nebraska's gain exceeds Kansas' [sic] loss").

8 8.

Id.

89. See Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1070-71 (Thoras, J. dissenting) (characterizing the amount as
either an "arbitrary penalty" or a circumvention of the "American Rule" that the loser does not
usually pay the winner's legal fees); ct Zamir, supranote 78, at 2113-14 (arguing thata promisor's
unjustified gain is not inherently a loss to the promisee).
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Master gave no explanation of how he weighed them to reach a number." Of
course the difference between $1,800,000 and, say, $1,900,000, might be inarticulable, but the Court should have at least given a rough sense of how the
factors should be weighed to produce a number far below the "more than several multiples" by which Nebraska's profits exceeded Kansas's loss."
Calling the award disgorgement also appears inconsistent with the denial of
injunctive relief. As discussed above, Justice Kagan relied on the situation's
being a "recipe for breach" to support the disgorgement award." That makes
sense since the promisor's incentives only need to be altered when there is a
risk of nonperformance. At the same time, however, she also asserted that the
likelihood of future breach was lowto justify making the award small and denying an injunction." The apparent contradiction is not irreconcilable; the Court
may believe that the probability of future breach is generally low but just high
enough to merit a small nudge. This approach would be unusual but not illogical." If that is the case, however, the Court should take special care to explain
why $1,800,000, of all numbers, provides the right amount of deterrence instead of rubber-stamping the Master's analysis that made no such calculation.`
It is also possible that the award was intended to do something other than adjust
Nebraska's incentives. Perhaps the Court agreed with the Master that Kansas
should be compensated for its transaction costs. Or maybe the Court intended
the damages to be punitive; dicta in Texas III hinted that the most culpable
breaches might merit "additional sanctions."" If the Court had either of these
aims, however, it should have said so clearly instead of distorting contract law
by calling its award disgorgement.
C.

STANDARD FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Finally, the Court's opinion does nothing to clarify the appropriate standard
for injunctive relief in interstate disputes. Although Justice Kagan implied that
compact cases would require the same "cognizable danger of recurrent violation" as other injunctions, she did not explain how strict that standard is or how
it should be applied in an interstate water case." The Court's opinion leaves
unresolved a pair of seemingly contradictory precedents. In North Dakota v.
Minesota, the Court held that sovereignty concerns preclude an Interstate injunction unless the complainant state establishes a threat of "serious magnitude"
by clear and convincing evidence." In Texas III, however, the Court issued an
injunction requiring New Mexico to comply with the reformed compact even

90. See Report of the Special Master, supranote 15, at 179-80.
91. See id. at 178.
92. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1057.
93. Id. at 1059.
94. Cf Roberts, supranote 81, at 139 (suggesting that elTective disgorgement must completely
eliminate the profitability of breach).
95. See Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1056-58.
96. Texas v. New Mexico (Texas Ill), 482 U.S. 124, 132 (1987).
97. See Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1059 (citing United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629,
633 (1953)).
98. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374 (1923) (quoting New York v. New Jcrsey,
256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921)).
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though New Mexico had acted in good faith up until then." By failing to either
overrule Texas Illor explain why that case satisfied the "cognizable danger"
standard while Kansas did not, the Court has left future disputants without guidance on when a state suffering compact breach is entitled to an injunction.
The majority in Kansas based its holdings on broad powers of equity in
interstate disputes, violating the principle that modern equity is subject to constraints by rules and standards. But the Court could have reached the same
results by clarifying general principles for fesolving water compact cases. The
Court partially did this on the question of compact interpretation, adopting a
rule that ancillary technical agreements can be reformed to fit the compact's
intended allocation."o The Court should have similarly explained its damages
award-either by establishing a balancing test for flexible disgorgement remedies
based on the threat of future breach or by classifying the damages as something
other than disgorgement-and should have clarified the standard behind its denial of injunctive relief, especially by either distinguishing or overruling Texas
III
IV. CONCLUSION
The Constitution's compact clause encourages states to settle their disputes
through peaceful negotiation.'" Predictability in how the Court will enforce
those agreements is necessary for states to make informed decisions about how
to maintain and modify them as circumstances change.o' Had the Court officially embraced or repudiated technical reformation earlier, a major part of the
Kansas suit could have been settled well before trial. Its adopting such a rule in
Kansas is a step toward creating a coherent water compact jurisprudence. Until
the Court does the same on the questions of damages and injunctions, the justices will continue to face lawsuits between states that cannot make informed
decisions to settle water disputes out of court.
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102. Decisions that rely on standardless equity powers give parties out of possession an incentive to sue rather than negotiate. See Home, supra note 75, at 102-03 (discussing the "perverse
logical madness" incentivized by the Court's "erratic results" based on "equity" in water compact
cases); see also Sarine, supranote 2, at 546.

